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IRREPARABLE INJURY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
No xAAxr is more familiar than the commonplace that courts pass upon
the constitutionality of statutes and other acts of government only when
the issue is inevitably presented in litigation.' It is this fiction that courts
settle cases, and do not as such declare the right and wrong of constitutional
conflicts, which more than any other defines the place, the scope and the
speed of judicial review, and keeps it within limits more or less tolerable
in a nominally democratic political system.2 Operational studies of the sev-
eral technical phases of this concept, as they have been stretched and tvisted
in constitutional law, contribute illuminating detail to the analysis of judi-
cial review as an institution, and of the judicial process as an art.
1. For a discussion of this doctrine, see the concurring opinion of Brandeis, J.,
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 283, 341 (1936); Arnold,
Trial by Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 Htnv. L. REv. 913.
2. See Comment, The Case Concept and Some Recent Indirect Procedures for
Attacking the Constitutionality of Federal Regutatory Statttes (1936) 45 Yssx L. J.
649. Among the recent cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to pass upon
the constitutionality of a statute in injunction suits because of a failure to show irre-
parable injury are Moor v. Te.-as & N. 0. R. 1L, 297 U. S. 101 (1936) (Cotton Control
Act) ; Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935) (National Industrial
Recovery Act); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 293 U. S. 226 (1936) (dis-
criminatory liquor license law).
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For the manipulation of these private law ideas, especially of those
used to test the appropriateness of an exercise of judicial power, has been
a conspicuously effective item of juristic technique throughout the life of
the Supreme Court. Merely orthodox judges have automatically accepted
the canons which purport to determine the propriety of dealing with con-
flicts in court as "cases" :-e. g., the statutes and conventions which set the
boundaries of jurisdiction, the simple rules. associated with the formulation
of a "case in controversy," and the maxims of discretion in equity. Judges
anxious to extend the power of the courts have weakened, and judges
anxious to confine that power have tried to 'fortify such restrictions on judi-
cial review. The result is that in no other part of the literature of constitu-
tional law are technical rules so flexible and so submissive to judicial will,
although no constitutional rules look so convincingly impersonal when writ-
ten into opinions; and nowhere can one watch more clearly the push and
pull of the competing attitudes which determine the form and in part the
substance of judicial review.
This Comment will be concerned with the current r6le of one such con-
cept in constitutional litigation-that of irreparable injury. It is one of the
conventional rules of equity that relief may be had only if the remedy at
law is inadequate. Of the various allegations that may be used to satisfy
this requirement, the one most commonly employed in attacking the con-
stitutionality of a statute by injunction is the threat of irreparable property
damage.3 The idea reference of the phrase is of baffling vagueness. Efforts
to vitalize the term by re-defining it at greater length have done little to
clarify its meaning. Thus, it is said that the injury must be material and
actual, not fanciful and theoretical ;4 that by irreparable injury is not meant
such hs is beyorid all possibility of compensation or repair, but an injury,
whether great or small, that ought not to be inflicted, and for which no fair
or reasonable redress can be had in a court of law;u and that the injury
may be irreparable either because of its nature or because of the irrespon-
sibility of the party committing it.6
Nor does an analysis of the cases granting injunctions in constitutional
litigation on the ground of irreparable injury reveal that the term has any
3. Although the rule is frequently stated that equity protects only property rights
[see EATON, EQuTrY (2d ed. 1923) 542; LEwvis & SPELLING, THE LAW OF IUI3cNOTioNs
(1926) 118], it is now recognized that other interests may receive -the protection of
a court of equity. See Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923)
33 YAm L. J. 115; Chafee, The Progress of the Law, zz9--1z92o (1921) 34 Hltxv. L.
REv. 388, 407.
4. Genet v. Delaware & 1-1. Canal Co., 122 N. Y. 505, 529, 25 N. E. 922, 926
(1890) ; EATON, EQuITY (2d ed. 1923) 530.
5. LEWIS & SPELLING, THE LAW OF INJUN cTIONS (1926) 86.
6. Id. at 85.
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single accepted connotation in that area. An attempt has been made to
classify some of the more recent decisions according to the standards the
courts apparently have in mind when dealing with this concept. Roughly,
the cases fall into three principal categories: (1) those requiring an absolute
amount of injury as a pre-requisite to injunctive relief; (2) those which
attempt to measure the injury in relative terms, thereby adopting the test of
a balance of convenience; (3) those which either ignore the concept or apply
it merely as an empty form, thus rendering it innocuous as a limitation upon
the court's power to decide constitutional issues.
Absolute Standards of Injury. The cases within the first category are not
entirely homogeneous. While they all purport to require some absolute
degree of injury, the quantum of injury which suffices ranges from quite
apparent damage to highly intangible harm. Probably the cases in which the
element of irreparable injury is piesent in its most obvious form are those
involving statutes which impose a direct pecuniary loss on the persons
affected. Such cases often arise out of attacks on the constitutionality of
public utility regulation and tax statutes. As an example of the former class
of cases, suppose that the legislature, or a commission exercising legislative
powers, orders a railroad to lower its fares. The change is to be made im-
mediately and the usual provisions for judicial review will not afford any
chance of relief for some time. Penalties such as heavy fines for the railroad
and imprisonment of its employees are imposed for a violation of the order.
Although the railroad contends that the proposed rates are so low as to
be confiscatory, and hence unconstitutional as a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law, it is effectively prevented from violating the order
and asserting its contention as a defense in the ensuing prosecution by the
threat of the drastic penalties which will be imposed if the statute ii upheld.
If it complies with the order until the constitutional issue can be decided by
the statutory method of judicial review, it suffers an irreparable loss every
time it accepts a fare at the new low rate. Consequently the railroad is
entitled to an injunction against the officer charged with enforcing the order
so that an immediate court decision may be had on the constitutional ques-
tion.7
7. Exr parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) ; Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 41S (1927).
It is held that the penalty is itself unconstitutional if it is so heavy as to deter
a person from litigating his constitutional rights. But this does not prevent the bringing
of an injunction suit for the dual purpose of restraining the enforcement of the invalid
penalties and obtaining a decision upon the constitutionality of the separable regulatory
features of the statute. Phoeni- Ry. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277 (1915); Willcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909). An interesting logical impasse is presented
when the court decides that an injunction is a proper method of raising the constitutional
issue because of the threat of serious injury from the penalties, and enjoins the enforce-
ment of the penalties because they prevent raising the question of constitutionality.
Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920).
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In the other recurring situation where irreparable injury is readily ap-
parent in the form of a direct pecuniary loss, a tax statute is involved.
Assume that it contains no provision for refunding illegally collected taxes;
that there are penalties for failure to pay promptly, or there is a summary
procedure for collection; and that the collector himself is financially irre-
sponsible, his bond being inadequate. Under these circumstances, the tax-
payer who refuses payment hoping to assert his defense that the statute is
unconstitutional in the consequent suit for collection either subjects himself
to penalties or his property to liens; and if he pays the tax, he has little
chance of later recovering it, in view of the sovereign's immunity from suit,
even though the- statute is subsequently held invalid.8 Many courts have
therefore granted injunctions promptly when confronted with such facts.0
In other tax cases where direct pecuniary loss in involved, some courts have
been willing to hold that although the remedy at law is theoretically ade-
quate, 0 the actual uncertainty attendant on any attempt to recover illegally
collected taxes from an unwilling sovereign is a sufficient threat of irreparable
injury to justify relief even in the face of the statute which expressly forbids
a federal court to enjoin the collection of taxes.'1 This situation is perhaps
best illustrated by the cases involving the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.12
When attacks were made upon that Act, several hundred injunctions were
entered against the collection of the processing tax,'3 despite the fact that
8. See Field, Recovery of Illegal and Unconstiltutional Taxer (1932) 45 Heav.
L. REv. S01.
9. Even the failure to allow interest on taxes paid under protest justifies an
injunction against 'collection of an invalid tax. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v.
Sherman, 2 F. (2d) 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Southern California Telephone Co. v.
Hopkins, 13 F. (2d) 814 (C.C.A. 9th, 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 393 (1928). And the
fact ihat payment of the tax would place the taxpayer in danger of insolvency is
ground for equitable relief. Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907).
10. Furthermore, it has been held that the remedy is inadequate in the federal
courts and hence a federal court may enjoin collection of the tax if the legal remedy
is cognizable only in a state court. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291
U, S. 24 (1934); see Lockwood, Maw & Rosenberry, The U.Se of the Federal In junc-
tion (1929) 43 H.fv. L. REv. 426.
11. REv. STAT. § 3224 (1867), 26 U.S.C. § 1543 (1934). This section has been
held to be meiely declaratory of the generally acknowledged rule of equity that the
collection of a tax will nt be restrained solely upon the grounds of its illegality.
Hence "extraordinary circumstances" justify the issuance of an injunption. Miller
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932); Hill v. Wallace 259 U.S. 44
(1922). It has also been held that this statute does not prevent enjoining the collection
of penalties which purport to .be taxes. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922);
Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922); see Comment (1935) 49 Hru.
L. REv. 109; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 769.
12. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U.S. C. §601 (1934).
13. See Cohen v. Durning, 11 F. Supp. 824, 828 (S.D. N.Y. 1935). Very few
of these cases were reported.
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a suit for the recovery of illegally assessed taxes was maintainable at law.14
Subsequently an amendment to the Act was proposed to the effect that if
the tax were declared unconstitutional, a recovery could be had at law only
by those processors who could show that they had not passed the tax on
to their customers. The fact that such a bill -was pending and might possibly
be adopted was regarded by many courts as a sufficient threat of irreparable
injury to warrant injunctive relief.r Other courts took the view, however,
that this threatened contraction of the legal remedy was not enough to
justify such a remedy.' 0 On August 24, 1935, the proposed amendment was
enacted, together with a provision forbidding action either for a declaratory
judgment or for an injunction against the collection of processing taxes.' 7
Yet injunctions continued to be issued, even by the courts which had pre-
viously refused to grant them.' s But there still remained a substantial num-
ber of federal courts which continued to refuse to enjoin the collection of
processing taxes.10 Finally the United States Supreme Court, in the case
14. 47 STAT. 286 (1932), 26 U.S. C. §§ 1672, 1673 (1934).
15. Neild Mffg. Corp. v. Hassett, 11 F. Supp. 642 (D. Mass. 1935); Gold Medal
Foods v. tandy, 11 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935); Washburn Crosby Co. v. Nee, 11
F. Supp. 822 (W. D. Mo. 1935); Inland Milling Co. v. Huston, 11 F. Supp. 813 (S.
D. Iowa 1935) ; Danahy Packing Co. v. McGowan, 11 F. Supp. 920 (W. D. N.Y. 1935);
John A. Gebelein, Inc. v. Milbourne, 12 F. Supp. 105 (D. lid. 1935); IKingan &
Co. v. Smith, 12 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ind. 1935).
16. Fisher Flouring Mills v. Vierhus, 73 F. (2d) 8,9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Lake
Erie Provision Co. v. Moore, 11 F. Supp. 522 (N. D. Ohio 1935); La Croh v. United
States, 11 F. Supp. 817 (W. D. Tenn. 1935); Cohen v. Durning, 11 F. Supp. 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Merkel, Inc. v. Rasquin, 12 F. Supp. 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
17. 49 STAT. 770, 7 U.S.C. §623 (Supp. 1935). The DEcL.Amxory Jurm.2MT
AcT was amended so as to prevent its application not only to processing taxes but to
all taxes. 49 STAT. 1027, 28 U. S.C. § 400 (Supp. 1935).
I8. Merchants' Packing Co. v. Rogan, 79 F. (2d) 1 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935) ; E. Regens-
burg & Sons v. Higgins, 79 F. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Albers Bros. Milling
Co. v. Vierhus, 80 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); G. R. B. Smith Milling Ce. v.
Thoias, 11 F. Supp. 833 (N. D. Te. 1935) ; Baltic Mills Co. v. Bitgood, 12 F. Supp.
132 (D. Conn. 1935) ; Larrabee Flour fills v. Nee, 12 F: Supp. 395 (NV. D. Mo. 1935) ;
A. P. W. Paper Co. v. Riley, 12 F. Supp. 738 (N.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Processing
Tax Case, 13 F. Supp. 218 (W. D. Te. 1935).
The opinion was expressed that such an amendment was void as a denial of due
process of law- See A. P. ,V. Paper Co. v. Riley, supra; Inland Milling Co. v. Huston,
12 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. Iowa 1935); Danahy Packing Co. v. McGowan, 12 F. Supp.
457 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); Gold Medal Foods v. Landy, 12 F. Supp. 405 (D. Minn.
1935).
19. Some courts held that the remedy at law under the amended statute "as still
adequate. Jose Escalante & Co. v. Fontenot, 79 F. (2d) 343 (C.C. A. 5th, 1935);
Rickei-t Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot, 79 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Meridan
Grain Co. v. Fly, 12 F. Supp. 64 (S. D. Miss. 1935); Henrietta Mills v. Hoey, 12 F.
Supp. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Merkel, Inc. v. Rasquin, 12 F. Supp. 215 (E.D.N.Y.
1935) ; Rieder v. Rogan, 12 F. Supp. 3.07 .(S. D. Cal. 1935). These courts relied upon
United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1934), which upheld a state
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of Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, seemingly upheld this use of the in-
junction by granting first a temporary restraining order,20 and later, after
having declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional, 2' a per-
manent injunction against the collection of the processing tax.22
In other situations, injunctions have been granted where the challenged
statute did not impose any direct pecuniary loss, but threatened an indirect
injury, the severity of wh-ich was much more difficult to ascertain. Thus,
equitable relief has been granted merely on the ground that the complainant
was entitled to freedom from harassment by government officials. This is
the basis upon which injunctions have been issued against the activities of
the Labor Relations Board. The terms of the Act creating that Board prevent
an attack upon its constitutionality based upon the usual complaint that
injurious regulations are being imposed under the threat of penalties. The
orders of the Board are not self executing, but can be enforced only upon
application to a circuit court of appeals, and penalties are imposed only for
disobedience of the court order.23 Accordingly, no direct injury can result
to a complainant until there has been an adjudication as to the constitu-
tionality of the Act, for he need not comply with an order until then, and
he incurs no penalties in refusing to obey.24 But complainants have, alleged
sales tax statute requiring, as a condition precedent to the recovery of an illegal assess-
ment, proof that the tax had not been passed on to purchasers. At least one court
took the view that a common law action against the collector would furnish an ade-
quate remedy. Frye & Co. v. Vierhus, 12 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Wash. 1935). Some
courts took the position that regardless of the adequacy of the legal remedy, they had
no jdrisdiction under the statute to enjoin the collection of the processing taxes.
Rickert Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot, supra; Meridan Grain Co. v. Fly, supra;
Rieder v. Rogan, supra; Grosvenor-Dale Co. v. Bitgood, 12 F. Supp. 416 (D. Conn.
1935); Jones v. Viley, 12 F. Supp. 476 (D. Idaho 1935); Louisville Provision Co. v.
Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 545 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
20. 296 U.S. 569 (1935).
21. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
22. 297 U.S. 110 (1936). In Huston v. Iowa Soap Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1936)
4 U. S. L. Wauc 85, the court, in refusing to enjoin the collection of the cocoanut oil
processing tax, declared that the Rickert case was no authority for the issuance of an
injunction, since in that case the Supreme Court decided only that the impounded
funds should be returned to the petitioner. However, the Rickert case was relied upon
in a recent decision restraining the collection of the new "windfall tax." Xingan &
Co. v. Smith, S. D. Ind., (1936) 4 U. S. L. Wn-- 98, 106, 120.
23. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 449, 453, 29 U.S. C. §§ 151, 160
(Supp. 1935).
24. In this respect the LABOR Acr is comparable to Section 10 of the FEDERAL
TRADE CommissioN Acr, 38 STAT, 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1934). Grounds for
an attack upon the latter Act by injunction were held to be lacking in Federal Trade
Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927). And in Federal Trade
Commission v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927), an injunction
was denied although penalties had already begun to accrue. But cf. Federal Trade
Commission v. Millers' National Federation, 23 F. (2d) 968 (App. D. C. 1928); see
Comment (1936) 4 GEo. WASH. L. Rsv. 391.
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that they were threatened with irreparable injury in that they were being
subjected to the inconvenience and expense of taldig part in an adminis-
trative hearing; that they would lose good will from the resulting publicity;
and that there was being created a condition of unrest, distraction, and a
lowered efficiency among their employees as a result of the Board's investi-
gations or elections. In several cases, injunctions were issued to prevent
the continuance of this alleged harassment. But other courts held that such
annoyance was too speculative and indirect to warrant relief, contending
that the incidental effort involved in cooperating with a government admin-
istrative body was in no sense irreparable injury.P
While in the cases affording relief from harassment the injury alleged is
indirect and somewhat difficult to measure, there is at least the threat of
imminent annoyance. In another group of cases, the grounds for injunction
seem even more intangible, in that no present threat of injury e.dsts, the
injunction being granted in order to protect the complainant from the dread
that some time in the future he might have to choose between suffering
injury by complying with a statute or by incurring heavy perlalties.
For example, in Kern Trading Co. v. Associated Pipe Line Co., a state
statute purported to empower the state railroad commission to regulate the
use of pipe lines and provided penalties for those whd failed to comply.-
The regulations were subject to review in the state supreme court, and hence,
under the rule of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., could not be attacked
in the federal courts until review in the state courts was exhausted.P A
stocldolder of the Associated Company filed a bill in the federal court to
enjoin the Company from complying with the regulations and to restrain
the state officials from enforcing the penalties, claiminj that the statute was
unconstitutional and that the Company was being coerced into obedience
by the penalties. The bill disclosed no threat by the officials other than an
25. Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (NV. D. Mo. 1935), aff'd, (C. C.A. 8th, 1936)
3 U.S. L. WIV 1241; Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 53 (N. D. Ill.
1936); Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 407 (N. D. Olda. 1936);
El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, 15 F. Supp. 81 (W. D. Tex. 1936); Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. Meyers, (D. Mass. 1936) 3 U.S.L. Wm n 1257; Oberman & Co.
v. Pratt, (W. D. Mo. 1936) 4 U.S. L. IV=a 184.
26. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A.
Sth, 1936), cert. denied Oct. 12, 1936, (1936) 4 U. S. L. Wr= 145; Carlisle Lumber
Co. v. Hope, 83 F. (2d) 92 (C. C.A. 9th, 1936); Bemis Bag Co. v. Feidelson, 13 F.
Supp. 153 (W. D. Tenn. 1936), aff'd, No. 7325, (C.C. A. 6th, 1936); Ohio Custom
Garment Co. v. Lind, 13 F. Supp. 533 (S. D. Ohio 1936); Precision Castings Co. v.
Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877 (W. D. N. Y. 1936); Associated Press v. Herrick, 13 F. Supp.
897 (S.D. N.Y. 1936); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander, 14 F. Supp. 201
(S. D. Cal. 1936); Buchsbaum v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 444 (N. D. IlL 1936); John
Blood & Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 779 (E. D. Pa. 1936); Jamestowm Veneer Corp.
v. Boland, 15 F. Supp. 28 (W. D. N. Y. 1936).
27. 217 Fed. 273 (N. D. Cal. 1914).
28. 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
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investigation to determine whether the terms of the statute applied to the
Company. Yet in order that the Company and its stockholders might be
relieved from -dread, the court granted an injunction restraining the state
officials from attempting to collect any fees or penalties until the validity
of the regulations had been passed upon by the state court.
Relief from dread also seems to be the ground upon which some injunc-
tions have been issued against the threatened revocation of milk licenses
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The policy of the Administration
was to issue licenses to all producers and distributors within a defined area
whether the licensees desired them or riot. The Act empowered the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to revoke and suspend these licenses after due notice
and opportunity for hearing if their terms, which included the regulations
made by the Administration, were violated.20 Any person who did business
without a license was subject to a maximum fine of $1,000 per day. Pro-
ducers who were unwilling to comply sought to have the Administration
restrained, -nd some injunctions were issued, seemingly upon the showing
of no other injury than that the complainant was being subjected to a
certain amount of investigation and the dread of penalties which might be
inflicted after notice and hearing and revocation of his license.30 But other
courts took the contrary view that in such a situation there was no imme-
diate danger of injury, and hence denied the applications on grounds of
prematurity.31
The Balance of Convenience. In striking contrast with the cases which
treat irreparable injury in absolute terms as being either existent or non-
existent in a particular situation are the decisions looking to the balance of
convenience, in which it is repeated that injunctions are denied unless the
29. AGRICULTURAL ADjUSTmENT Acr, § 8(3), 48 STAT. 34, 35 (1933), since replaced
by 49 STAT. 753, 7 U. S. C. § 608c(14) (15) (Supp. 1935).
30. Darger v. Hill, 76 F. (2d) 198 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935); Edgewater Dairy Co.
v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Douglas v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 379
(W. D. Okla. 1934); Royal Dairy Farms v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934);
Columbus Milk Producer's Ass'n v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 1014 (N. D. Ill. 1934); cf.
Time Supply Stores, Inc. v. Hawking, 9 F. Supp. 888 (S. D. Fla. 1935). These cases
appear to conflict with the familiar rules that a court will not anticipate an unlawful
act by an administrative officer, and that injunctions will not issue until administrative
remedies have been exhausted. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S.
159 (1929); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926); First National Bank v. Albright,
208 U.S. 548 (1908); see Alpert, Suits against Adminisirative Agencies folder NIRA
and A.A.A. (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 393; Black, At What Stage May a Licescea
Seek Relief ituder the Agricultural Adjustment Act? (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 354.
31. Sparks v. M%,fellwood Dairy, 74 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934); Yarnell
v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Black v. Little,
8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934); cf. Abe Rafelson Co. v. Tugwell, 79 F. (2d) 653
(C. C.A. 7th, 1935) (Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act).
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benefit to be derived from them would outweigh the inconvenience they
would cause.
A representative case is Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co.,
where a stockholder sought to restrain the collection of a tax.-32 In dis-
missing the bill the Supreme Court pointed out that the tax amounted to
only $1,875 annually upon a $50,000 corporation, or less than a dollar a
year for complainantgs share, and that this was not serious enough to
justify thwarting the policy of Congress that a tax must be paid before its
validity is challenged.
A similar problem came up in Ashwander v. Tcnnessce Valley Authority,
which was a suit for an injunction brought by a relatively small group of
public utility stockholders-1900 persons owning 40,000 preferred shares-
for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the federal govern-
ment's electric power projects in the Tennessee Valley.p Four justices,
speaking through the Chief Justice, concluded that "while their holdings
are small . . . they should not be denied the relief which would be accorded,
to one who owned more shares."''  McReynolds, J., dissenting, also took
that view. But the other four justices, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
asserted that the record was barren of any evidence that the property of the
complainants was in such peril as to justify equitable relief.
The balance of convenience approach is more apt to be taken in the
lower federal courts where an opinion on a constitutional question does
little to remove the doubt leading to the controversy. Several of the lower
courts enjoined the collection of processing taxes and impounded the funds
on this basis.30 In many of the cases, no opinion was expressed as to the
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.30 The ground of these
decisions was simply that with the funds impounded, the government ran
little risk of losing the money to which it would be entitled if the Act were
subsequently upheld, whereas if the taxpayer was compelled to pay the
taxes, he would run a very considerable risk of being unable to recover them
even though the Act were ultimately invalidated.37
32. 187 U. S. 455 (1903).
33. 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
34. Id.at3!8.
35. See, e.g., Danahy Packing Co. v. McGowan, 11 F. Supp. 920, 923 (W. D.
N. Y. 1935); John A. Gebelein, Inc. v. Milbourne, 12 F. Supp. 105, 121 (D. Md.
1935) ; Kingan v. Smith, 12 F. Supp. 329, 337 (S. D. Ind. 1935).
36. Injunctions may also be issued by courts which believe the challenged statute
to be constitutional: R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Ky.
1935) ; or when the court holds that the act is not applicable to complainant: Modem
Woodmen of America v. Casados, 15 F. Supp. 483 (D. New fMes. 1936).
37. Compare Independent Workers v. Beman, 13 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.I1L1936),
in which a preliminary injunction against the National Labor, Relations Board was
granted pending final determination of the constitutional question, on the ground that
inury to the complainant would be certain and irreparable, while the granting of the
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Where the balance of convenience doctrine is employed, the trial court's
discretion necessarily becomes of great importance, since the decision turns
upon the particular facts of each case. And to the extent. that the trial court's
discretion is controlling, the principle of stare decisis has little effect. This
explains why one district judge, after examining the probable injury to the
parties, refused to enjoin the collection of processing taxes38 although the
circuit court of appeals for that circuit had already granted an injunction
in a similar case; 30 and conversely, why a district court in another circuit,
after making a finding of irreparable injury, refused to dissolve an injunc-
tion it had issued against the collection of processing taxes 4° despite the
fact that the circuit court for that circuit had previously affirmed a decision
denying such relief,41 the latter holding being interpreted merely as a refusal
to inteffere with the trial court's discretion.
The balance of convenience doctrine has been extended to authorize the
granting of an injunction even when the actual quantum of irreparable
injury is very small. Cautionary injunctions are issued when some injury
might possibly ensue, and when there seems to be no harm in maintaining
the status quo until the constitutional question is finally settled. This relief
is regarded as especially appropriate when an early decision by the Supreme
Court is expected. Restraining orders were issued upon cautionary grounds
against the administration of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act;42 and
injunction would not seriously damage or inconvenience the defendants. See also Pratt
v. Stout, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 3 U. S. L. WEEK 1241; Precision Castings Co. v. Boland,
13 F. Supp. 877, 886 (W. D. N. Y. 1936) (refusing an injunction against the Labor
Board "if it is shown that they [the injuries to complainant] are in the public interest
and the burden is imposed on all alike."); Birkheiser v. L6s Angeles, 11 F. Supp.
689 (S. D. Cal. 1935) (refusing to dismiss an injunction against the enforcement of
an ordinance forbidding the nighttime delivery of milk because "when the equities of
the respective suitors are weighed and the grave constitutional questions are considered,
greater injury is threatened by removing the restraint that now exists than by con-
tinuing it temporarily." A bond of $50,000 was required to indemnify the city against
any increased expense which might be incurred by reason of nighttime inspection of
milk); cf. Munoy v. Porto Rico Power Co., 83 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936)f
Atlantic Pipe Line Co. v. State Tax Board, 12 F. Supp. 265 (W. D. Tex. 1935) (the
confusion which would result from sfispending the taxing power of state and county
was specified as a reason for not enjoining an allegedly unconstitutional tax) ; Menominee
& Marinette L. & T. Co. v. Menominee, 11 F. Supp. 989 (W. D. Mich. 1935) (Munici-
pal power plant to be financed by P.W.A.).
38. Rieder v. Rogan, 12 F. Supp. 307 (S. D. Cal. 1935); Compare Moor v. Texas
& N. 0. R. R., 75 F. (2d) 386, 390 (C. C.A. 5th, 1935), cert. dismissed, 297 U. S.
101 (1936).
39. Merchants' Packing Co. v. Rogan, 79 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
40. G. R. B. Smith Milling Co. v. Thomas, 11 F. Supp. 833 (N. D. Tex. 1935).
41. Jose Escalante & C9. v. Fontenot, 79 F. (2d) 343 (C. C.A. 5th, 1935).
42. Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Rothensies, 13 F. Supp. 321 (E. D. Pa. 1935) ; R. C.
Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Ky. 1935) (after holding the Act to
be constitutional).
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a number of courts took that approach in the processing tax cases,43 thus
avoiding a close exmmination of the adequacy of the remedy at law.
Disregard of Irreparable Injury. There are two classes of cases in which
the existence of irreparable injury is apparently of very little practical im-
portance. 'The first is suggested by several decisions in which, despite the
apparent adequacy of the remedy at law, an injunction was granted without
mention of the grounds on which equitable relief was predicated.4-1 The
explanation of this omission may well be that the parties did not raise the
question, inasmuch as the defense that there is an adequate remedy at law
can be waived," provided that the court does not raise the point on its own
motion.40
The second and more noteworthy group consists of cases which, although
sometimes making obeisance to the conventional requirement of irreparable
injury, apparently proceed on the theory that a complainant who is affected
by an unconstitutional statute is entitled to judicial protection without any
further showing of injury, and that if other remedies will not give him
adequate protection, injunctive relief is proper. T These decrees which recog-
nize an enforceable "right to be let alone" are typically issued by courts who
are confident that the statute which is attacked is unconstitutional in its
entirety, and thus are able to conclude that the wisest policy is to restrain
the enforcement of the statute at the earliest possible moment. For exaple,
in Hill v. Darger, complainants were engaged in the milk business. The
Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the local market administrator,
was preparing to revoke their licenses under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, but had not yet done so. In granting an injunction against the market
administrator, the district court explained the grounds of injunctive relief
in these simple terms: "One who performs any act violative of individual
right must find statutory warrant for the authority that he attempts to
exercise, and in default of such warrant he may be enjoined."$8
43. Albers Bros. Milling Co. v. Vierhus, 80 F. (2d) 700 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935);
E. Regensburg & Sons v. Higgins, 79 F. (2d) 516 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); Danahy
Packing Co. v. McGowan, 11 F. Supp. 920 (IV. D. N. Y. 1935).
44. Among the more important of such cases are Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
45. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922).
46. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927);
Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 658 (1891) ; see (1926) 36 Y= L. J.
143.
47. This is logically consistent with the idea behind such cases as Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897), that the right to conduct one's business as one
pleases is a property right; hence any regulation of business, however beneficial, is
a taking of property.
48. 8 F. Supp. 189, 191 (S. D. Cal. 1934), aff'd, 76 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935); cf. Mississippi Valley Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan, 8 F. Supp. 3S8 (W. D.
Tenn. 1934).
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Many of the cases in this group seem to recognize in addition to the
right to be let alone a right to litigate constitutional issues.49 In Hart Coal
Corp. v. Sparks, for example, complainant sought to enjoin the district
attorney from enforcing the penalties for violation of a code under the
National Industrial Recovery Act, contending that the Act was unconsti-
tutional, and that heavy penalties were threatened for those who did not
obey. The district court held the Act unconstitutional and granted the in-
junction, but made no specific finding of irreparable injury.60 The Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed for the reason that such injury had neither been
found by the judge nor was sufficiently obvious on the record to permit an
appellate court to make such a finding, "especially in view of the contention
that the wage and hour scale is but a part of a stabilizing program which
includes also the stabilization of prices of the plaintiff's product."', When
the case went back to the district court it was urged by counsel that this
language required, as a prerequisite to injunctive relief, a finding that the
injury to the plaintiff was so substantial as to outweigh the benefits of price
stabilization. But the district court replied that such could not have been
the meaning of the appellate court, else the situation might arise in which
an unconstitutional statute could not be attacked because its benefits out-
weighed the injuries it caused.5 2
49. It is sometimes said that if the act is entirely void as to the complainant the
administrative remedy which it provides is also void and complainant need not avail
himself of it. From this it is concluded that an injunction is a proper remedy. See
Darger v. Hill, 76 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) (milk license); Stout v. Pratt,
12 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Mo. 1935) (National Labor Relations Board); Royal Dairy
Farm v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934). But none of the Supremd Court
cases generally cited for this proposition go so far as to say that the enforcement of
a void act can be enjoined without a proper showing of irreparable injury. See Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (1886) (holding that an unconstitutional statute
creates no rights); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (injunction
against zoning ordinance held proper becaise the existence of the ordinance injured
the value of land); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920) (risk
of heavy penalties deterred review in state courts); cf. Northport Power Co. v.
Hartley, 283 U. S. 568, 570 (1931).
50. 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934).
51. Sparks v. Hart Coal Corp., 74 F. (2d) 697, 700 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
52. The court said: "Whenever the government unconstitutionally ititerferes with
the right of a citizen to do business in his own way, that interference constitutes an
injury to the property rights of* the citizen. If that interference takes the form of
exacting the payment of wages in excess of what the citizen is willing to pay, to the
extent of the increased wages this citizen has been injured in his property rights.
Surely, in such a situation the government cannot justify its action by demonstrating
that the increased wages are more than absorbed by increased profits flowing to the
citizen as a result of operating his business under the illegal regulation thereof by
the government. If such is the law then a benevolent despotism at Washington can
take charge of all business in this country, regulating wages and hours of service and
all the other elements thereof, and the citizen would have no redress unless he could
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In this group of cases the threat of a penalty for noncompliance with an
unconstitutional statute is of itself recognized as sufficient grounds for equit-
able relief, regardless of whether compliance with the act would result in
any substantial irreparable injury.P3 For example, in Liphc v. Lcdcrer the
complainant alleged that unconstitutional penalties had been levied against
him in the guise of a tax, and that because he refused to pay them his
property was about to be seized by warrant of distress.Y' A majority of the
court held that the threatened injury to the complainant mas sufficient to
entitle him to an injunction against the tax collector, although, as the dis-
senting justices pointed out, he might have avoided all injury merely by
submitting to the unconstitutional statute temporarily, paying the amount
which was demanded, and then bringing a suit for recovery at law.
The issue of whether the consequences of compliance should be considered
also arose when the validity of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was
being attacked. The statite made compliance with the code voluntary, but
assessed an excise tax of 15%o on 'the sale price of coal at the mine with a
90% drawback for those who. filed an acceptance of the code.P The Act
further provided that any person aggrieved by an administrative order issued
thereunder could obtain review in the circuit court of appeals,;G and: that
acceptance of the provisions of the code and the drawing back of taxes
would not estop any producer from contesting the constitutionality of the
Act. 7 It would therefore appear that although a producer who signified
his willingness to comply with the code might be subjecting himself to some
disturbance of his usual manner of doing business, he was not necessarily
demonstrate that operation under government supervision would result in a loss to him
which otherwise would not have been sustained." 9 F. Supp. 825, V-8 (NV. D. Ky.
1935).
53. In order to be consistent with the doctrine that equity acts only to prevent
injuries which the complainant cannot himself avoid (see Lrwis & SPErnza, Tim
LAw op INjuncrIoxs (1926) 46), the consequences of obeying an unconstitutional law
should be considered as well as the consequences of disobedience. There are some cases
which seem to sustain this view. See Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 20 (1922);
Arkansas Bldg. & Loari Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 274 (1S99); Shelton . Platt,
139 U. S. 591 (1891); Sparks v. Hart Coal Corp., 74 F. (2d) 697, 70 (C. C. A. 6th,
1934); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Early, 13 F. Supp. 610, 612 (V. D. Va. 1936).
Regarding the effect of a penalty, per se, see Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 662 (1915).
In Grosjean v. Musser, 74 F. (2d) 741 (C. C.A. Sth, 1935), an injunction against
the collection of a cigaret tax was refused for want of federal jurisdiction because the
amount in controversy was less than $3,0O0. The jurisdictional amount was held to
be the amount of the tax and not the amount of the penalty that was threatened.
Cf. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 293 U. S. 178 (1936).
54. 259 U. S. 557 (1922).
55. Section 3. 49 STAT. 993, 15 U. S. C. § S04 (Supp. 1935).
56. Section 6. 49 STAT. 1003, 15 U.S.C. § 310(b) (Supp. 1935).
57. See note 55, stpra.
1936]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
exposed to any substantial injury until the Board began to impose regula-
tions, at which time he could litigate his rights in the circuit court of
appeals. Nevertheless injunctions were granted preventing the collection
of the 15% tax from non-members because an injunction was the only
method by which a non-member could attack the constitutionality of the
act without submitting to an unconstitutional statute. One of the suits
attacking this Act which went to the Supreme Court was a bill for an in-
junction brought by a coal producer against the collector of internal revenueP
The majority opinion stated briefly that the action was maintainable because
of impending injury, presumably referring to the imposition of the 15'
penalty-tax. The dissenting justices, on the other hand, declared that the
complainants were crying before they were hurt, inasmuch as a subscriber
to the code who was doubtful as to its validity was afforded complete pro-
tection under the terms of the Act. This conclusion of the dissenters was
based, however, upon the assumption that the act was in part valid, a view
not shared by the majority. The minority opinion explained, obiter, that
if the whole statute were a nullity, the complainants were at liberty to resist
the taxgatherer as a trespasser, and that it would be no answer to the
prayer for injunctive relief to say that the complainants might avert the
penalty by declaring themselves code members and later fighting the statute.00
Conclusion. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from an examina-
tion of the constitutional cases involving the question of irreparable injury
is that from a* doctrinal standpoint they are hopelessly confusing, illogical
and inconsistent. Even the relatively small group of Supreme Court deci-
sions cannot be reconciled on the basis of legal theory. The extent of this
58. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bell, 13 F. Supp. 37 (W. D. Pa. 1935); Pocahontas
Fuel Co. v. Early, 13 F. Supp. 605 (W. D. Va. 1935). The latter court refused to
issue a similar injunction on behalf of a producer who had joined the code. Jewell
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Early, 13 F. Supp. 610 (W. D. Va. 1936). Cf. Mississippi Valley
Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan, 8 F. Supp. 388 (W. D. Tenn. 1934) (enforcement of
N.LR.A. enjoined); Acme, Inc. v. Besson, 10 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J.1935) (enforce-
ment of N.I.R.A. enjoined); Grandin Farmers' Co. v. Langer, 5 F. Supp. 425 (D. N. D.
1934) (enforcement of state grain embargo enjoined).
59. R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, sub. nom. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.
238 (1936), re'a'g 12 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Ky. 1935). . ,
60. Cardozo, J., said: "If the whole statute were a nullity the coiplainants would
be at liberty to stay the hand of the tax-gatherer threatening to collect the penalty,
for collection in such circumstances would be a trespass, an illegal and forbidden act
[citing cases] . . . It would be no answer to say that the complainants might avert
the penalty by declaring themselves code members (§ 3) and fighting the statute after-
wards. In the circumstances supposed there would be no power in the national govern-
ment to put that constraint upon them. The Act by hypothesis being void in all its
parts as a regulatory measure, the complainants might stand their ground, refuse to
sign anything, and resist the onslaught of the collector as the aggression of a tres-
passer." 298 U. S. at 338.
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confusion suggests that it does not result merely from differing views as to
the ultimate content of legal ideas, but from more fundamental differences
in judicial attitude brought into play because of the function now being per-
formed by the concept of irreparable injury.
The political supremacy of the judiciary in the American system of govern-
ment is limited only by the self-restraint of the judges, nd by the form in
which judicial power must be exercised: that is, by the fact that a court is
a court, and can answer questions only when litigants ask, or at least suggest
them. Some of the restrictions which surround the exercise of this supremacy
are said to be imposed by the Constitution, like the familiar doctrine that
a court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislative or executive
acts unless it is necessary to the settlement of the rights of adverse and
presently interested parties to a case or controversy.0' In other instances,
however, the courts may accept self-imposed limitations derived from the
body of private law doctrine. Of the latter class is the rule imported into
constitutional litigation from equity that irreparable injury is a prerequisite
to an injunction against the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.G2
What has happened is that the irreparable injury concept has been abused
and distorted in constitutional litigation by judges willing to simplify access
to the courts in constitutional cases. The attitude, now strongly ascendant,
that procedural difficulties of framing constitutional cases should be mini-
mized, is supported by two groups: those who distrust legislatures and view
the courts as a bulwark for the protection of individual rights;03 and those
who argue on grounds of apparent efficiency and justice that since the con-
stitutionality of important statutes is almost always adjudicated sooner or
later, a decision should be obtainable as soon after the passage of an act as
circumstances permit, so as to eliminate long periods of uncertainty during
which much may be done which.perhaps will eventually have to be undone.c"
Either one of these views would naturally support the policy of weakening
inhibitions on the speedy exercise of judicial power, and therefore favor
reducing to a minimum the requirements of the irreparable injury concept.
But the objectives of those who seek a speedy method of judicial review
might be attained better and more directly under declaratory judgment
61. See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L J. 649.
62. it re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (188); Moor v. Teas & N. 0. R. R., 297
U. S. 101 (1936); HIGr, liTNiJcUNC s (4th ed. 1905) § 64.
63. See Beck, The Balance Wheel of the Cons!itution (1934-35) Pnoc:snws,
N. L BAR Ass'x 173; Otis, The Constittion and the Courts (1936) 4 ,,uz. Cx
L REv. 51; Reed, Shall We Have Constitutional Liberty, or Dictatorshipf (1936)
7 Mo. B. . 37; Williams, The Attack upon the Supreme Court (1923) 7 Couisr.
REv. 143.
64. See Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court (1936) 85 U. o?
P-4- L. REv. 27, 78; BoRcHAmi, DCLmAATORY JUGIuI ns (1934) 302, 624; Comment
(1932) 41 YAE L. J. 1195.
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statutes than by an extension of the injunction.65 For the declaratory judg-
ment, as an alternative to the irregular injunction, has the advantage of
not re4uiring a change of basic legal concepts, a fact manifestly of some
importance if it is in the social interest to preserve these particular legal
ideas relatively intact in their older form for private law purposes: the
confusion of doctrine 'as to irreparable injury in constitutional cases may,
for example, have unfortunate consequences if used as a precedent in private
law suits.6
An entirely different attitude toward judicial review is taken by those
who desire both to reduce the number of occasions for constitutional deci-
sions and to postpone such occasions as long as possible when they cannot
be entirely avoided, preserving the power of the courts for ultimate and
unavoidable contingencies, few in number, and presumably great in influ-
ence. The feeling that we would be better off with fewer constitutional
decisions is based in part on the belief that when courts pass upon the
validity of statutes framed to remedy economic and social ills, they neces-
sarily act as super-legislatures re-examining the wisdom of the measures,
a function supposedly delegated to those who are responsible to the elec-
torate. Moreover, it is felt that every such decision brings to a head a
conflict between theoretically co-ordinate branches of the government, thus
engendering friction which it would be wise to minimize.07 The reason
advanced for delaying to the utmost those constitutional determinations
which are concededly inevitable is the simple one, rooted in a strong sympathy
for the powers of legislatures, that the government should be given as long
a time as possible in which to demonstrate the social utility of new legis-
lation before the Supreme Court passes upon its "reasonableness." To the
65. A number of courts have recognized this to the extent of granting a declaratory
judgment although refusing an injunction. E.g., Penn v. Glenn, 10 F. Supp. 483
(W. D. Ky. 1935); Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934); Associated
Industries v. Department of Labor, 158 Misc. 350, 286 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
But cf. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936) (holding that a court of equity is not authorized to interfere with admin-
istrative proceedings by a declaratory judgment when it would not do so by injunction).
See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDG ENTS (1934) 169, 277, 551, 556.
66. 'Consider, for example, the possibility of using the Ashwgnder and the Carcr
Coal cases as a basis for strike litigation against the management of a corporation.
Contrast their holding with that of other stockholders' suits involving no constitutional
ipsues. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261 (1917);
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881).
67. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constiittion (1931) 45 HARv.
L. REv. 33, 79; Frankfurter & Hart, The Supreme Court at October Term, 1934 (1935)
49 HARv. L. REv. 68, 90; Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions (1924) 37 I-hxgv.
L. RE v. 1002. Even the late James M. Beck contended that despite the advantages of
a quick decision outright advisory opinions were undesirable because they plunged
the court into the midst of a political controversy, thereby impairing its prestige. See
Beck, loc. cit. mtpra note 63.
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objection that a period of incertainty will ensue, it is answered that any
uncertainty is merely the result of a refusal to regard laws in practice, as
well as in theory, as valid until the Supreme Court has passed upon them.
A court which proceeds on these premises will pass upon the constitu-
tionality of an act in an injunction suit only when the conditions precedent
to an exercise of its equity powers, viewed strictly, are satisfied-that is,
when the complainant can show that he is being threatened with substantial
and unavoidable injury irreparable at law. Relief from mere harassment
and dread will not be granted, nor will a right to be free of unconstitutional
statutes be recognized as such, without some other and definite complaint
of injury. Occasionally the balance of convenience test might be adopted,
but only for the purpose of denying injunctive relief despite a showing of
irreparable injury where the threatened harm to the complainant is out-
weighed by the evils *of impeding ihe administration of a statute which may
eventually be held constitutional. 8 "
This view of the judicial function regards as irrelevant to the process
of constitutional litigation those considerations which relax the historic
requirements of equity jurisdiction in private litigation, or which support
the use in such litigation of the declaratory judgment. Like the advocates
of the declaratory judgment, persons of this view support a judicial policy
of confining the use of the injunction in constitutional cases; their reason,
however, is not an interest in preserving the integrity of legal forms and
concepts, but a general policy of minimizing access to the courts in consti-
tutional cases. While future development of the declaratory judgment may
make this solicitous limitation on the boundaries of the injunction academic,
it remains to be seen how effective the declaratory judgment will become
in fulfilling the ends now served by unorthodox injunctions69  Meanwhile,
those who would contract judicial power repeat that the issue in constitutional
6. A report of Chairman of the Federal Power Commission states that from SS
to December 1, 1935, 278 petitions for injunctions had been filed against 195 public
authorities in the United States, causing a total delay of over 289 -years, and a total
direct expense of $376,000. Sm. Doc. No. 182, .74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). An
amendment to the Tennessee Valley Act proposed by Senator Norris would require
any person seeking an injunction against the Authority to post a bond which mould
cover a great number of possible injuries, including attorney fees, loss of revenue to
the Authority, and increased cost of electricity to consumers. S. 2095, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1935).
69. The courts are by no means agreed as to what is a proper occasion for declar-
atory relief. Compare Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F.
(2d) 97 (C. C.A. 5th, 1936) and International Mutoscope Reel Co. v. Valentine, 247
App. Div. 130, 286 N. Y. Supp. S06 (1st Dep't 1936) (both holding declaratory judg-
ment improper because injunction would be improper) with Nesbitt v. Manufacturers!
Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 AUt. 403 (1933) (holding declaratory judgment
improper because other relief was available). See Comment. (1936) 46 YA= L 3.
286,-293, 299.
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